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Fitting International Shoe to
Jurisdiction Over Property:
Shaffer v. Heitner
The century-old doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neffl has been displaced.
Pennoyer predicated the adjudicatory authority of a court on the
jurisdiction's power over property within its territorial boundaries.
In Shaffer v. Heitner,2 however, the Supreme Court of the United
States declared that "the presence of property in a State does not
automatically confer jurisdiction over the owners interest in that
property,"3 thereby rejecting the fiction that property has a legal status
apart from the interests of persons who claim or control it. Shqffer
proclaimed a single, unified standard of fourteenth amendment due
process: "[A]Il assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny.,
4
The jurisdictional dispute in Shaffer was unusual; plaintiff had
attempted to compel defendants to appear by causing the Delaware
court to seize defendants' intangible property that was present in the
state only constructively by operation of statute.5 Yet that specialized
assertion of jurisdiction quasi in rem, exemplifying a broad and signif-
icant category of jurisdiction based on the presence of property in
the forum, afforded the Court an opportunity to announce a comprehen-
sive jurisdictional theory.
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
3. Id. at 211.
4. Id. at 212.
5. Plaintiff brought a shareholders derivative suit in Delaware against Greyhound. a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona, a wholly owned Grey-
hound subsidiary, and twenty-eight present or former officers and directors whose alleged
breach of duty had exposed the two corporations to antitrust damages and criminal contempt
fines approaching fourteen million dollars. Simultaneously plaintiff filed a motion for se-
questration of the Delaware property of the individual defendants. Pursuant to the Delaware
sequestration statute, DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1974), shares of Greyhound stock and options
belonging to twenty-one of the defendants were "seized" by placing "stop transfers" orders
on the books of Greyhound. Although none of the stock certificates were physically present
in Delaware, the stock was considered constructively present by virtue of a statute, DEL CODE
tit. 8, § 169 (1974), that makes Delaware the situs of ownership of all stock in Delaware cor-
porations.
Sequestration is expressly intended to compel a nonresident to appear and defend a suit in
equity. It is not a security device; if the defendant enters a general appearance, the sequestered
property is routinely released. If the defendant defaults, the property is sold and the proceeds
applied in satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim. The Delaware statute embraces any and all
property of the nonresident defendant.
Defendants whose property had been sequestered entered a special appearance to quash
service, asserting inter alia that they lacked sufficient contacts with Delaware to be subject to
its jurisdiction consistent with the principles of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945). The Delaware courts sustained jurisdiction quasi in rem based on the statutory
presence of the stock in Delaware. The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice Marshall, reversed. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 195 (1977).
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This Case Comment demonstrates that the Shaffer Court intended
the new, plenary jurisdictional standard to be the in personam
"minimum contacts" standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton6 and Hanson v. Denckla Application of the "minimum contacts"
standard, however, threatens the very existence of major categories
of state court jurisdiction that the Court could not have meant to dis-
card, such as trust adjudication and probate. The writer suggests an
interpretation of Shaffer that preserves the vitality of the Court's expan-
sive new doctrine of fairness yet accommodates indispensable exercises
of state court jurisdiction.
I. THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION FOR Shaffer
An analysis of Shaffer necessarily commences with Pennover v.
Neff8 Its "principles, and corollaries derived from them, became the
basic elements of the constitutional doctrine governing state court
jurisdiction." 9  Neff, a nonresident, was sued in Oregon by Mitchell
to recover attorney's fees. Notice was published in local newspapers
but personal service was not made. After a default judgment was en-
tered, Neff's Oregon property was seized and sold to satisfy the judg-
ment. Neff, asserting that the prior judgment and sale were invalid,
then sued Pennoyer, the purchaser at the execution sale, to recover the
property.
Justice Field, writing for the Court in Pennoyer, declared "two
well-established principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of
an independent State over persons and property. " 1° The first prin-
ciple was "that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sov-
ereignty over persons and property within its territory"; the second,
"that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over per-
sons or property without its territory." i t
In Pennoyer Oregon's jurisdiction ultimately failed because the
nonresident defendant had neither been personally served with pro-
cess in Oregon nor consented to jurisdiction there;12 nor had defen-
dant's Oregon property been seized by order of the court at the com-
mencement of the action. Thus, the Oregon court lacked physical
power over the person or the property of the defendant within its ter-
ritorial limits and could not adjudicate the controversy.
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
8. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
9. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 198-99 (1977).
10. 95 U.S. at 722.
11. Id.
12. Today, the facts of Pennoyer would support jurisdiction in personam under a long
arm statute since defendant had allegedly incurred the disputed contractual obligation in the
forum state. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968 & Supp. 1978).
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One crucial result of Pennoyer, carefully nurtured and vigorously
employed during the past century, was that formal attachment of the
nonresident defendant's property present within the forum permitted
the courts of the forum to adjudicate any controversy the defendant
might be called to defend, whether or not the controversy bore any
relationship to the seized property, or even to the forum state. A
judgment in an action based on property was, however, limited to the
value of the property seized.'
3
The Pennoyer concept of jurisdiction, based on the physical
power of the sovereign states, is reflected in the traditional vocabu-
lary of jurisdiction and judgments:
If . . . jurisdiction is based on . . . authority over the defendant's
person, the action and judgment are denominated "in personam" and
can impose a personal obligation on the defendant in favor of the plain-
tiff. If jurisdiction is based on the court's power over property within
its territory, the action is called "in rem" or "quasi in rem.'
' 4
The distinctions among actions in rem and actions quasi in rem are
that:
A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in designated
property. A judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of particular
persons in designated property. [Judgments quasi in rem are] of two
types. In [the first type] the plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing
claim in the subject property and to extinguish or establish the nonexis-
tence of similar interests of particular persons. In the [second type]
the plaintiff seeks to apply what he concedes to be the property of the
defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him. 5
It is important to review the historical context of Pennoyer and
the social policies its theory served.16  In the words of Professor
Hazard, "[it is notorious that we are a mobile population, and we have
been such since the beginning . . . . The vastness and richness of the
land has made wide-ranging economic adventure attractive. And
this, too, has been true since the beginning of our history."7 That
mobility, however, has not been universal; unlimited personal travel
was, and is, a privilege of the few. By 1877, the year Pennoyer was
13. Shaffer retains the limitation on liability. 433 U.S. at 207 n.23, 209 n.32.
14. Id. at 199.
15. Id. at 199 n.17 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958) (citing
RE TATEMEN-r OF JUDGMENTs 5-9 (1942)).
This paper will use the abbreviations "quasi in rem I" and "quasi in rem 11" to refer to
the two types of actions quasi in rem. Although the Shafer Court deliberately used "in rear
to mean "in rem and quasi in rem," the distinctions are exceedingly important and will be
maintained. The jurisdiction sought to be asserted in Shqjer was quasi in rem 11. although
the Delaware statute was expressly designed to coerce a defendant's general appearance with
full personal liability.
16. "lIThe merits of rules of adjudicatory authority depend on the extent to %hich they
further the policies to be served . . . ." Smit, The Enduring Utility of in Rent Rules: A Lasting
Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 600, 606 (1977).
17. Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241. 246.
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decided, the availability of transcontinental rail travel had widened
the gap between the mobile minority and the stationary majority.
Transient persons could more easily venture from, say, New Jersey
to Oregon, purchase property there, incur debt, and depart. Few
Oregon creditors, however, given the state of communications in 1877,
could pursue their debtors to distant courts.
When the Pennoyer Court condoned quasi in rem actions by resi-
dent plaintiffs,18 it was attempting a practical solution to this problem.
The Court was not indifferent to considerations of fairness in 1877;
the Pennoyer Court must implicitly have determined that, on balance,
the utility and fairness of automatic property-based jurisdiction out-
weighed its unfairness to defendants. Without quasi in rem 11 juris-
diction many tort plaintiffs might have been denied any practical
opportunity to obtain even partial satisfaction of claims against tran-
sient defendants. Without quasi in rem I jurisdiction to determine
ownership of real property within the forum, the alienability of land
and its consequent economic development would have been impeded
significantly.
This explanation admittedly does not accommodate Pennoyer's
unfortunate offspring, Harris v. Balk.19 Harris, a resident of North
Carolina, owed a debt to Balk, also a resident of North Carolina. Balk,
in turn, owed a debt to Epstein, a resident of Maryland. When Har-
ris visited Maryland he was personally served with a writ of attach-
ment garnishing his debt to Balk. A default judgment was entered
against Balk and Harris paid Epstein. Balk then sued in North
Carolina to recover the debt owed him by Harris. The Court ruled
18. "[T]he State, through its tribunals, may subject property situated within its limits
owned by non-residents to the payment of the demand of its own citizens against them .... "
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding this language,
quasi in rem jurisdiction has seldom been restricted to resident plaintiffs,
19. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). Harris in turn spawned the contemporary doctrine of Seider
v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). The Seider plaintiffs, resi-
dents of New York, had been injured in a Vermont automobile accident through the alleged
negligence of defendant, a Canadian resident. Quasi in rem jurisdiction was obtained in New
York by attachment of the obligation of defendant's insurer, a Connecticut company with New
York offices, to defend and indemnify him. Seider is a controversial decision that has not been
widely followed. See, e.g., Javorek v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 529, 552 P.2d 728 131 Cal.
Zptr. 768 (1976); Stein, Jurisdiction by Attachment of Liability In.,urance, 43 N.Y.U, L. Rtv.
1075 (1968); Comment, Jurisdiction in Rem and the Attachment of Intangibles: Erosion of the
Power Theory, 1968 DUKE L.J. 725.
The constitutionality of the Seider procedure was upheld, on the basis of Harris, in Simpson
v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), and in Minichiello v.
Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 410 F.2d 117, cerl. denied,
396 U.S. 844 (1969). This procedure is available only to New York resident plaintiffs, or non-
residents injured in accidents in New York. Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969). Recovery may not exceed the liability limits
of the policy. Soon after Shaffer was decided a New York federal di!;trict court allowed a Scider
attachment. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 46 U.S.L.W. 2184 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1977),
Only weeks later a New York state court rejected the doctrine in light of Shaffer. Katz v. Umansky,
399 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1977). The latter result is probably correct, given that Harris, from which
Seider took constitutional justification, is the only case clearly overrviled by Shaffer, 433 U.S. at
212 n.39.
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that the Maryland judgment must be given full faith and credit by
the North Carolina court; Harris' payment to Epstein discharged
his debt to Balk. In the Shaffer Court's analysis, "the debt Harris
owed Balk was an intangible form of property belonging to Balk,
and . . . the location of that property traveled with the debtor. By
obtaining personal jurisdiction over Harris, Epstein had 'arrested' his
debt to Balk . . . and brought it into the Maryland court.
' 20
Even though the debt owed the nonresident defendant, Balk, by
the garnishee, Harris, was undisputed, the defendant had been sub-
jected to jurisdiction in a forum where, but for the debtor's peregri-
nations beyond the defendant's control, the defendant had no property,
let alone personal affiliations. Epstein's surveillance of Balk's affairs
must have been quite keen to follow the activities of Harris, Balk's
debtor. Thus, it seems Epstein would have suffered little hardship
had he been' forced to bring an in personam action against Balk
in North Carolina, a forum easily accessible from Maryland by rail at
the time.
Harris notwithstanding, the Pennoyer territorial rationale, invok-
ing power over either the person or his property within the forum,
was a reasonably effective device for its era. Perhaps a different
scheme might have served equally well in 1877 and have aged more
gracefully, but the point is that the Pennoyer rules evolved in histori-
cal context to meet the needs of the developing nation. When the
need for the doctrine had been lessened by modern developments in
transportation and communication,2' the unfairness of some aspects of
the Pennoyer rules, especially the Harris outcropping, could begin to
be acknowledged without creating an insoluble dilemma for the legal
system.
While the Pennoyer scheme for property-based jurisdiction per-
sisted essentially unaltered until Shqffer, the acknowledgment of Pen-
noyer's unfairness began in the context of personal jurisdiction. Ini-
tially in personam jurisdiction expanded markedly within the constraints
of the Pennoyer power rationaleY Pennoyer had
approved the practice of considering a foreign corporation doing busi-
ness in a State to have consented to being sued in that State. . . . This
basis for in personam jurisdiction . . . was later supplemented by the
doctrine that a corporation doing business in a State could be deemed
"present" . . . and so subject to service of process under the rule of
Pennoyer.
Similarly, jurisdiction over nonresident motorists who had caused
20. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 200 (1977).
21. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
22. See, e.g., Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts-from Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cm. L RE%. 569
(1958).
23. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 201-02 (1977) (citations deleted).
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injury within the forum was sanctioned "by use of a legal fiction that
left the conceptual structure established in Pennoyer theoretically
unaltered": 24 constructive appointment by the motorist of a state of-
ficial as his process agent.
The policy considerations underlying these developments parallel
those previously suggested for permitting jurisdiction quasi in rem.
It defeated important objectives of the legal system to require the
local plaintiff injured in the conduct of his local activities to pursue
the transient defendant to a distant forum and undergo the difficulties
of conducting litigation at remove. Expanded jurisdiction in personam
was necessary even though in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction
were fully operative. A nonresident defendant might own no prop-
erty in the forum where the events leading to litigation occurred, or
might own property in the forum whose value was far too low to
satisfy a judgment for the plaintiff.
Finally, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,26 the Court
set aside the historical basis of in personam jurisdiction, power over
the defendant's person.
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to per-
sonal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.",27
The Court found that the International Shoe Company was subject to
the judicial and taxing jurisdiction of the State of Washington because
the corporation had "such contacts . . . with the state of the forum as
make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of govern-
ment, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit .. .,28
The Court rejected mechanical or quantitative determinations of rea-
sonableness:
Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality
and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administra-
tion of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to
insure. That clause does not contemplate that a state may make bind-
ing a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defen-
dant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations."
In the words of the Shaffer Court, after International Shoe "the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,
24. Id. at 202.
25. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
26. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
27. Id. at 316, quoted in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203 (1977).
28. Id. at 317, quoted in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203 (1977).
29. Id. at 319, quoted in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 216 (1977).
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rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which
the rules of Pennoyer rest, became the central concern of the inquiry
into personal jurisdiction." 0
State legislatures, taking their lead from the suggestion in Inter-
national Shoe that even a single act of sufficient gravity might sub-
ject a nonresident to suit in the forum, 31 enacted "long arm" statutes
authorizing in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents.32 Typically,
these statutes asserted jurisdiction when the nonresident defendant
was alleged to have committed a tort in the forum state or to have
entered into a contract or a transaction involving real property there.
When the defendant was an individual it was usually clear that he
himself, or his actual agent, 33 had been directly involved with the
plaintiff. But when the defendant was a corporation and the plaintiff
an individual of modest means, attenuated contacts of the nonresi-
dent defendant were sometimes found to satisfy the requirements of
International Shoe.34
As the language previously quoted from International Shoe in-
dicates, and as Shaffer reiterated, it is a threshhold requirement for
personal jurisdiction that there be contacts, ties or relations between
the defendant and the forum.35 Yet in McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co. the Court held that it was "sufficient for purposes of
due process that the suit was based on a contract which had sub-
stantial connection with [the forum] State."36 The judgment that the
Court upheld in McGee had been entered by a California court
against a Texas insurance company whose sole contact with California
had been to reinsure a California decedent who held a policy origin-
ally issued by the insurer's Arizona predecessor. The Court pointed
out that
California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of re-
dress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims. These
residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to fol-
low the insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally
accountable. When claims were small . . . individual claimants fre-
quently could not afford the cost of bringing action in foreign forum-
thus in effect making the company judgment proof.37
30. 433 U.S. at 204.
31. 326 U.S. at 318.
32. See, e.g., Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL L.F. 533.
33. See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 11 IlL 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
34. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Buckeye Boiler
Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
35. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
36. 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (emphasis added).
37. Id.
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The McGee Court dealt squarely with practical policy consider-
ations, avoiding formal notions of defendant-forum contact. The con-
tract, not the defendant, was asserted to possess the requisite con-
nection with the forum.38  The result seems intuitively fair. Given
McGee, it appeared that a general inquiry into fairness-weighing the
interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the forum-would be suf-
ficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts" standard of International
Shoe.
Just one year later, however, in Hanson v. Denckla,39 the Court
limited the expansion of state court jurisdiction in personam. Dis-
tinguishing McGee as a case whose "cause of action . . . arises out
of an act done or transaction consummated in the forum State," the
Court declared that
[t]he unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a non-
resident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the
forum State. . . .[I]t is essential ...that there b. some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protec-
tions of its laws." 40
Hanson has been recognized as a persistent obstacle to in per-
sonam jurisdiction, although there has been disagreement about its
nature and extent. 4' The Supreme Court has not spoken directly on
38. One month before the Court's ruling in McGee, the California Supreme Court took a
similarly pragmatic position. Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom. Columbia Broadcas.ting Sys., Inc. v. Atkinson,
357 U.S. 569 (1958). The California court sustained jurisdiction quasi in rem over a New York
trustee who, regardless of the sufficiency of his personal contacts %ith California, could not be
subjected to an in personam judgment under the California jurisdictional statute then in force.
Justice Traynor's opinion states that "in the case of . . . intangibles jurisdiction must be
determined in the light of the totality of contacts with the state involved." 49 Cal. 2d at 347,
316 P.2d at 965. Since the action could not proceed without the trustee, the factors of fairness
to the plaintiffs, fairness to the defendants already before the court, risk of exposing the obligor
to multiple suits to enforce the same obligation, and "multiple contacts" with California were
held to justify bringing the trustee before the California tribunal. The "multiple contacts"
presumably linked the litigation and the other parties to California, since the court declined
to consider whether long-arm jurisdiction over the trustee would have been constitutional.
Perhaps the United States Supreme Court was acknowledging fundamental fairness rather
than relying on the traditional power rationale of quasi in rem jurisdiction when it denied
certiorari to Atkinson immediately after it had decided Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U'S. 235
(1958).
39. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Hanson was a complex case; its facts and the tortuous reason-
ing by which the Court reached a fair result are set forth and criticized by Professor Hazard,
Hazard, supra note 17, at 243. For present purposes it suffices to say that the Hanson Court
held that due process would be denied if Florida were allowed to assert in personam jurisdic-
tion over the Delaware corporate trustee of a trust created in Delaware whose scttlor had
removed to Florida, where she subsequently died. The Pennoyer territorial power theory re-
emerged in Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, to be summarily disclaimed by the Court in Shqffer,
433 U.S. at 204 n.20.
40. 357 U.S. at 253 (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Th:eory?,
26 KAN. L. REv. 61 (1977); Kurland, supra note 22; Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi In Rent
Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 Micn. L. REv. 300 (1970).
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in personam jurisdiction since it decided Hanson;42 for twenty years
the contours of in personam jurisdiction have been shaped exclusively
by the state and lower federal courts.
Some of the lower courts skirted the Hanson barrier, adroitly
pursuing the policy objectives implicit in International Shoe and ex-
pressed in McGee. Their efforts to extend in personam jurisdiction
were most successful when resident consumers or workers who had
sustained injury from defective products were allowed to bring suit
at home against foreign corporate manufacturers who transacted no
business directly in the forum. In Gray v. American Radiator & Stan-
dard Sanitary Corp.43 jurisdiction was sustained in Illinois over a for-
eign corporation that had produced a defective safety valve installed
in a water heater that exploded, injuring the resident plaintiff. The
Ohio defendant transacted no business in Illinois; it sold the finished
valves to the Pennsylvania manufacturer of the water heaters.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in reconciling the case with Hanson, ad-
dressed directly the economic and social policy issues:
[I]t is a reasonable inference that [the defendant's] commercial trans-
actions, like those of other manufacturers, result in substantial use and
consumption in this State ....
With the increasing specialization of commercial activity and the
growing interdependence of business enterprises it is seldom that a
manufacturer deals directly with consumers in other States. The fact
that the benefit he derives from its laws is an indirect one, however, does
not make it any the less essential to the conduct of his business; and it is
not unreasonable, where a cause of action arises from alleged defects in
his product, to say that the- use of such products in the ordinary course
of commerce is sufficient contact with this State to justify a requirement
that he defend here.
As a general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its products
for ultimate use in another State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable
there for any damage caused by defects in those products."
The California high court, confronted with a similar case, adopted
the Illinois approach and declared: "Only if isolated use or purchase
conclusively establishes lack of foreseeability that the product will
enter the state is the isolation necessarily fatal to jurisdiction over
the manufacturer; in that event there is a manifest lack of purposeful
activity on the part of the manufacturer."
45
42. The Court has, however, considered questions of due process related to property-
based jurisdiction. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965); Western Union TeL Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961). The Court has also spoken on significant issues of pro-
cedural due process. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
43. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
44. Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
45. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 904, 458 P.2d 57, 65, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113, 121 (1969).
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The foregoing discussion sketches the state of jurisdictional af-
fairs immediately preceding Shaffer. In the three decades since
International Shoe, jurisdiction in personam had become relatively
well defined. The traditional rules of jurisdiction quasi in rem II had
been attacked persistently by lower courts and commentators as unfair
and outmoded.46 At long last, "the time [was] ripe to consider whether
the standard of fairness and substantial justice set forth in International
Shoe should be held to govern actions in rem as well as in personam.
'
,
47
II. MINIMUM CONTACTS BECOMES THE PLENARY STANDARD
A. The Court Extends the In Personam Standard to In Rem
Jurisdiction
In Part III of his opinion for the Shaffer majority, Justice Marshall
made "[t]he case for applying to jurisdiction in rem the same test of
'fair play and substantial justice' as governs assertions of jurisdiction
in personam., 4'  He reasoned that "jurisdiction over a thing" is
equivalent to "jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing";
to assert jurisdiction in rem there must exist a sufficient basis to assert
jurisdiction over the interests of persons.4 9  He concluded that the
"standard for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over
the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is
the minimum contacts standard elucidated in International Shoe. "50
The Shaffer Court conceded that "the presence of property in a
State may bear upon the existence of jurisdiction by providing con-
tacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation."'"
Justice Marshall listed several factors that may affect the decision,
but warned that the list was neither exhaustive nor necessarily de-
cisive. 
52
The Court then raised and rebutted the arguments against ap-
plying the International Shoe test to the class of actions quasi in rem
II, such as Harris and Shaffer, which would be most radically affected
by the decision. The Court found no merit in the argument that mak-
ing the presence of property a sufficient basis for jurisdiction precludes
a wrongdoer from removing his assets to a forum where he is not
vulnerable to suit in personam. The defendant might have relocated
46. See, e.g., cases and articles cited in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 205. Both the
courts and the commentators have aimed their criticism mainly at quasi in rem II jurisdiction,
although Justice Marshall's opinion intimated a groundswell of disatisfaction with property-
based jurisdiction generally.
47. 433 U.S. at 206.
48. Id. at 207.
49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 208 n.28.
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his assets innocently, without motive to evade jurisdiction. And even a
devious defendant could not escape eventual justice merely by placing
his property in a forum in which the plaintiff could not obtain personal
jurisdiction: "The Full Faith and Credit Clause .. . makes the valid
in personam judgment of one State enforceable in all other States." 3
"At most," said the Court, this argument "suggests that a State in
which property is located should have jurisdiction to attach that prop-
erty, by use of proper procedures, as security for a judgment being
sought in a forum where the litigation can be maintained consistently
with International Shoe."
54
The Court briefly contemplated and rejected jurisdictional cer-
tainty and historical tradition as justifications for jurisdiction premised
solely on the presence of property in the forum, concluding "that all
assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to
the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny."' 5 It
seems evident that the Court contemplated as its standard minimum
contacts with the Hanson purposiveness requirement appended, not
the broader concept, "fair play and substantial justice." 56  The inter-
pretation of Shaffer to be offered in this paper does not vitiate Justice
Marshall's logic, but does suggest a more limited application for his
conclusion.
B. Has Shaffer Altered the Standard for In Personam
Jurisdiction?
Since the standards that govern in personam jurisdiction are now
to govern state court jurisdiction generally, one might legitimately
inquire whether Shaffer abridges the scope of in personam jurisdic-
tion over nonresidents. In applying its new rule to the facts of the
case,5 7 the Shaffer Court held that defendants' sequestered stock,
constructively present in Delaware, did not provide contacts with that
state sufficient to support jurisdiction in a shareholder's derivative
suit unrelated to the sequestered property. Speaking for the majority,
Justice Marshall explored other possible bases5" for Delaware jurisdic-
53. let at 210.
54. Id. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 46 U.S.L.W. 2194 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1977),
decided after Shaffer, upheld attachment in California of an S85,000,000 debt owed the French
corporate defendant by a California corporation, as security for arbitration pending in New
York, a forum with which defendants had sufficient contacts to satisfy International Shoe.
Although the debt, defendant's sole asset in the United States, bore no relation to the matters
under arbitration, defendant had agreed to litigate in California any disputes arising out of the
debtor-creditor relationship.
55. Id. at 212.
56. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra and notes 75-78 infra.
57. The facts are set forth in note 5 supra. The jurisdiction sought to be exercised in
Shaffer was quasi in rem II, which must now meet the minimum contacts standard.
58. Justice Brennan approved the Court's extension of International Shoe principles to
jurisdiction based on property, but roundly condemned the majority's examination of alternative
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tion over these directors and officers, in dicta that may augur a newly
restrictive approach to personal jurisdiction. Justice Marshall's analy-
sis is not consonant with two decades of lower court decisions and
commentary that had interpreted Hanson expansively and favored a
convergence of the principles of jurisdiction with the principles of
choice of law. 9
The Shaffer majority could discern no alternative foundation for
jurisdiction of the Delaware courts over these defendants, who had
performed no acts in Delaware. 60  Delaware's interest in the conduct
of officers of its domestic corporations might su'pport the application
of Delaware law to the controversy but did not make Delaware a fair
forum for the litigation.61  Similarly, defendants' acceptance of direc-
torships
establishes only that it is appropriate for Delaware law to govern ...
It does not demonstrate that appellants have "purpo,-efully avail[ed them-
selves] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,"
Hanson v. Denckla . . . in a way that would justify bringing them be-
fore a Delaware tribunal. Appellants have simply had nothing to do with
the State of Delaware. Moreover, appellants had no reason to expect to
be haled before a Delaware court.
62
Justice Brennan, dissenting from this aspect of the majority
opinion, argued with conviction that inquiries into jurisdiction and
choice of law should not be sundered:
[A] derivative action which raises allegations of abuses of the basic man-
agement of an institution whose existence is created by the State and
whose powers and duties are defined by state law fundamentally impli-
cates the public policies of that forum.
.. . [T]he decision that it is fair to bind a defendant by a State's laws
and rules should prove to be highly relevant to the fairness of permitting
that same State to accept jurisdiction for adjudicating the controversy. 6
Justice Brennan rejected as indecisive the fact that defendants
had not been shown to have entered or acted in Delaware. As for
expectations of jurisdiction, these defendants
grounds for jurisdiction as an impermissible advisory opinion. 433 U.S. at 220 (Brennan, J.,
cincurring and dissenting). He would have remanded to allow the Delaware courts to re-
interpret the challenged statute in light of the new rule. The Court's search for an alternative
basis might be viewed less harshly as an invitation to state courts to construe their existing
in rem and quasi in rem rules as conferring competence to adjudicate under the new standard,
in order to avoid a chaotic transition.
59. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Righter, 250 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966); Buckeye Boiler Co.
v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Gray v. American Radia-
tor & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Il1. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Smit, supra note 16;
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TExAs L. REv. 657 (1959); Devclpnents ifn
the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909 (1960).
60. 433 U.S. at 213.
61. Id. at 215.
62. Id. at 216.
63. Id. at 224-25 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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might be fairly charged with the understanding that Delaware would
decide to protect its substantial interests through its own courts, for they
certainly realized that in the past the sequestration law has been employed
primarily as a means of securing the appearance of corporate officials
... . Even in the absence of... a statute [expressing the state's in-
terest in controlling corporate fiduciaries], however, the close and special
association between a state corporation and its managers should apprise
the latter that the state may seek to offer a convenient forum for ad-
dressing claims of fiduciary breach of trust.64
The Court, as Justice Brennan intimated,65 could readily have
drawn an analogy between the shareholder's derivative action in
Shaffer and the litigation in Gray and McGee. Just as an individual
plaintiff may suffer particularized physical or economic injury at the
hands of a nonresident, so may a domestic corporation suffer injury
from its nonresident fiduciaries.
Regardless of whether Shaffer constricted the sphere of in per-
sonam jurisdiction, its further growth has apparently been curtailed.
Ironically, that curtailment is coupled with a sweeping extension of
the minimum contacts standard to all stite court jurisdiction. Shqffer
appears to insist on the Hanson purposiveness requirement, even when
fairness and the defendant's actual convenience do not demand it. It
is difficult, however, to interpret Hanson to accommodate all important,
fair exercises of state court jurisdiction under the minimum contacts
rubric. The difficulties become strikingly apparent when one considers
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.
66
III. Mullane: TAKING THE MEASURE OF Shqafer
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. 67 is pivotal to
an understanding and interpretation of Shaffer. The central issue in
Mullane was whether nonresident beneficiaries of a common trust fund
could be served by publication in a proceeding to settle the accounts
of the trustee. The appointed representative for the nonresident
beneficiaries argued that jurisdiction was improper because the bene-
ficiaries had not been personally served in what was assertedly an in
personam68 proceeding. The Court ruled that characterization of the
action as in rem or in personam was irrelevant;69 what mattered was
64. Id. at 227 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
65. Id. at 226 (Brennan J., concurring and dissenting).
66. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
67. Id.
68. The action is in personam with respect to the trustee, whose personal liability for
management of the trust funds is at issue, but not with respect to the beneficiaries, yet the
action is not in rem because the title or status of the trust res is not in dispute. Fraser, Juris-
diction by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. PA. L. Rev. 305, 305-09 (1951).
69. 339 U.S. at 312.
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whether the means of service was one reasonably calculated to give
notice.70
The Shaffer Court cited Mullane favorably as a bellwether of the
Court's discontent with traditional property rules. Justice Marshall
identified Mullane's imposition of more rigorous notice requirements
as the basis for a sequence of cases "recogniz[ing], contrary to Pen-
noyer, that in adverse judgment in rem directly affects the property
owner by dvesting him of his rights in the property before the court."
1
'
Further, Mullane held "that Fourteenth Amendment rights cannot
depend on the classification of an action as in rem or in personam.
72
Thus, there is justification to conclude that the Court in deciding
Shaffer did not intend to overrule the express approval of jurisdiction
by the Mullane Court. As the Court announced in Mullane:
[T]he interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that exist
by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision of
its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom a; to establish beyond
doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants,
resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity
to appear and be heard.7
Taking as an initial premise that Mullane survives Shaffer intact,
one may identify and perhaps resolve important conceptual difficul-
ties of Shaffer. If Mullane stands unaltered, New York's assertion of
jurisdiction over nonresident trust beneficiarie; must either satisfy
the minimum contacts standard articulated in International Shoe and
refined in Hanson, or be exempted from the minimum contacts re-
quirements. It is difficult to see how the nonresident beneficiaries in
Mullane could be made to meet the full minimum contacts require-
ments without watering down that standard or resorting to fiction.
The beneficiaries' claims upon the trust might be a contact with the
forum state sufficient, under International Shoe, to support jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate matters intimately related to those claims. There is,
however, no way to assure that each nonresident beneficiary has
"purposefully avail[ed] [him]self of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum State, 74 since some of the beneficiaries may be
unknown, others unborn.
The Shaffer Court showed no inclination to dilute the minimum
contacts standard by selectively deleting the Hanson purposiveness
requirement. To the contrary, the Court referred repeatedly to the
70. Id. at 315.
71. 433 U.S. at 206.
72. Id.
73. 339 U.S. at 313.
74. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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"same test"75 and "single standard" 76 before concluding that "all
assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to
the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny."77  As
it applied this standard to the parties before it, the Court left little
doubt that Hanson is preeminent among the "progeny";78 failure of
defendants to "purposefully avail" themselves of the Delaware forum
expressly precluded jurisdiction in Shaffer.
One could argue that Shaffer tacitly sanctioned a two-tiered
standard of minimum contacts under which some classes of defendants
need not satisfy the Hanson criterion, i.e., an expectation of receiving
the benefits of the protection of state law." Even that concession,
which would weaken Shaffer considerably, cannot accommodate all
exercises of state court jurisdiction. One distinctly awkward category,
as the Shaffer Court acknowledges,"0 is personal status.
The Court has long declined to invade or curtail the plenary
authority of the states over the status of their citizens. Speaking
for the Court in Pennoyer, Justice Field indicated the depth and
breadth of that authority:
The jurisdiction which every State possesses to determine the civil status
and capacities of all its inhabitants involves authority to prescribe the
conditions on which proceedings affecting them may be commenced
and carried on within its territory. The State, for example, has absolute
right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation be-
tween its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may
be dissolved.8'
An important category of status adjudication is divorce. Divorce
jurisdiction is grounded in the state's profound interest in family rela-
tions. In Williams v. North Carolina8 2 the Court spelled out some of
the policy considerations that underlie the present practice of allowing
a domiciliary of the forum to obtain an ex parte divorce from a non-
resident spouse who lacks any past or present association with the
forum.
Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the
marital status of persons domiciled within its borders. The marriage rela-
75. 433 U.S. at 207.
76. Id. at 209.
77. Id. at 212.
78. Professor Casad shares this view: "[Tihe way the [Shaffer] majority opinion analyzed
the contacts, ties or relations between Delaware and the issues and parties in this shareholders'
derivative suit strongly suggests that the majority is taking the physical contact approach of the
Hanson majority rather than the broader fairness approach of McGee." Casad, supra note 41,
at 77.
79. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L Rv. 70, 155 n.17 (1977).
80. 433 U.S. at 201.
81. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877).
82. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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tion creates problems of large social importance. Protection of offspring,
property interests, and the enforcement of marital responsibilities are but
a few of commanding problems in the field of domestic relations with
which the state must deal. Thus it is plain that each state, by virtue of
its command over its domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution
of marriage, can alter within its own borders the marriage status of the
spouse domiciled there, even though the other spouse is absent. There is
no constitutional barrier if the form and nature of the substituted service
.. .meet the requirements of due process.83
The Williams Court firmly rejected the historical view of divorce
as a proceeding in rem; at the same time it emphasized that a divorce
decree is more than an in personam judgment. 34  Despite the care
the Court took in Pennoyer and Williams to segregate status from the
in rem/in personam taxonomy, the effect of Hanson on ex parte divorce
was problematic. Justice Traynor noted:
State courts .. .are not free to take the initiative in abandoning
consideration of ex parte divorces in terms of a fictional res. So long
as they are thus constrained they must discourse in the jargon of in rem
jurisdiction, albeit with dismay that realistic analysis is thus obscured.
The constraint seems destined to continue. The Supreme Court's in-
sistence in . ..Hanson v. Denckla that defendant must have some con-
tact with the forum state compels resort to a fictional res when contact
cannot otherwise be established. 85
Although Justice Marshall offered reassurance that traditional
status adjudication was not changed by Hanson or Shaffer,8 6 an under-
lying conceptual uneasiness persists. If, as the Shaffer Court implies,
such jurisdiction may continue to be asserted freely, it can be reconciled
with the central reasoning of Shaffer only by looking beyond, not
within, a minimum contacts standard.
Justice Traynor's concern transcended divorce jurisdiction; he
urged more generally that courts should be "free to consider jurisdic-
tion at the outset in the complex of the parties' contacts with the
forum state, the interests of the state concerned in the outcome, and
a prevading [sic] concept of fair play to all parties."87 As the foregoing
discussion indicates, pervasive fair play does not inevitably demand
purposive contacts of the nonresident defendant with the forum state.
How, under Shaffer, shall the lower courts, and eventually the
Supreme Court itself, deal with a case such as Mullane, and with other
traditional exercises of fair and socially important state court juris-
diction, such as status, that cannot always satisfy the tests of minimum
contacts and purposiveness? The simplest solution, and therefore
83. Id. at 298.
84. Id. at 297.
85. Traynor, supra note 59, at 661.
86. 433 U.S. at 208 n.30.
87. Traynor, supra note 59, at 660.
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the one most likely to be applied, is to find such cases beyond the scope
of Shaffer. This possibility is provided by Shaffer itself, in two
capacious footnotes. In one footnote the Court expressly declined to
consider "whether the presence of a defendant's property in a State is
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is available to
the plaintiff."88 In the other footnote the Court declined to "suggest
that jurisdictional doctrines . . . such as the particularized rules gov-
erning adjudication of status, are inconsistent with the standard of
fairness."89
Justice Marshalf was scarcely obliged to draft his opinion to avoid
all conceivable jurisdictional dilemmas. Yet, having spoken so broadly
and forcefully, the Court might have anticipated that its rigorous
imposition of the minimum contacts test, coupled with an invitation
to make routine exceptions, might lead courts to tolerate the very
unfairness Shaffer seeks to eliminate.90 There will be great temptation
to conduct business as usual;91 in practice, a well-used exception tends
to enlarge the rule.
The Court could resolve the difficulties Shaffer provoked by re-
stricting the case to its facts.92 The tenor of the Court's opinion,
however, militates against such restriction. Even limitation of the
new rule to actions quasi in rem II would appear to be foreclosed by
the Court's express extension of the new standard to actions quasi in
rem 1.
93
IV. A PROPOSED RESOLUTION
This writer proposes a different approach to reconcile the de-
liberate breadth of Shaffer with the practical difficulty of applying a
single uniform rule to state court jurisdiction. Two steps are required.
First, as applied to the entirety of state court jurisdiction, "the standards
set forth in International Shoe and its progeny 94 should be interpreted
as the standards of "fair play and substantial justice," including but
not limited to "minimum contacts." Second, the Court's extension
88. 433 U.S. at 211 n.39.
89. Id. at 208 n.30.
90. Id. at 212.
91. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 46 U.S.LW. 2184 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,
1977) (approving a Seider attachment); Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (permitting jurisdictional attachment quasi in rem II of the New York bank account of
defendant in wrongful death action. Plaintiff's American decedent had died in Turkey, in an air
crash; defendent airline did not operate in the United States and lacked sufficient contacts to
sustain jurisdiction in personam in any American forum.).
92. "The unanimous Shaffer holding [is] that due process is denied when jurisdiction to
adjudicate any controversy concerning a nonresident defendant, with judgment enforceable
against any of his assets, is based on the statutory presence of his stock within the forum
state . . ." The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REv. 70, 157 (1977).
93. 433 U.S. at 207.
94. Id. at 212.
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of the in personam "minimum contacts" standard should be specifi-
cally limited to jurisdiction quasi in rem, of both the first and second
types; all other exercises of jurisdiction 95 must be fair and reasonable,
but need not satisfy the combined requirements of International Shoe
and Hanson.
96
"Minimum contacts" as it has developed from International Shoe,
is a complex concept; however, for all its flexibility, the minimum
contacts test does not exhaust jurisdictional due process. The touch-
stone of due process is fairness and reasonableness. The overriding
standard of due process proclaimed in International Shoe is "fair play
and substantial justice," of which "minimum contacts" is but a sub-
category, albeit one of signal importance. Thus, the proposed first
step is conceptually supportable and serves the Shaffer Court's avowed
purpose by imposing a universal standard upon state court jurisdic-
tion.
Many interests and values might properly be weighed to determine
whether a particular assertion of jurisdiction comports with "fair play
and substantial justice." These include the defendant's affiliations with
the forum, and his inconvenience at being required to litigate there;
the plaintiff's affiliations with the forum, and his justification for em-
ploying its courts; and the state's interests in creating a forum for
this controversy or class of controversies. In short, what has been
termed an interest analysis 97 should be undertaken. Looking among
the Court's own doctrines, these considerations resonate the broad
transactional test of McGee.
Shaffer's abolition of automatic jurisdiction over property imposes
a threshhold inquiry" into jurisdiction for all cases brought before a
state tribunal. The Court has signaled its willingness to tolerate this
"uncertainty inherent in the International Shoe standard." The un-
certainty is no greater, and indeed may be less, when "fair play and
substantial justice," rather than "minimum contacts" is taken to be
the International Shoe standard. The character of the inquiry is similar
under both tests, but under the broader fairness standard an excep-
95. These other exercises of jurisdiction include true in rem actions and actions, such as
adjudication of status or trusts, that elude the traditional in rem/quasi in rem/in personam
taxonomy.
96. The Shaffer Court appears to have imposed those reqairements uniformly upon state
court jurisdiction. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
97. See, e.g., Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State
Courts, 66 MicH. L. REv. 227 (1967); Smit, supra note 16; Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdic-
tion to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1128 (1966); Developmntnts
in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. Rgv. 909 (1960); Comment. supra note 41.
98. In the interests of fairness to the plaintiff, the jurisdictional inquiry should not be
protracted. See Comment, supra note 41, at 318. For certain categories of judicial business,
such as probate, the determination of fairness, once made, will generalize readily for subse-
quent litigation; other exercises of jurisdiction may demand more individualized and repeated
inquiry.
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tionally strong interest of the forum of the plaintiff may compensate
for the defendant's acknowledged lack of purposive contact with the
forum.
The second step, confining the minimum contacts standard to
jurisdiction quasi in rem, would resolve the confusion created by the
Court's announcement that "jurisdiction over many types of ac-
tions . ..now . . . brought in rem would not be affected by a hold-
ing that any assertion of state court jurisdiction must satisfy the
International Shoe standard."99  Contrary to the Court's statement,
"true" in rem jurisdiction, along with jurisdiction in Mullane, is fatally
affected by imposition of the minimum contacts standard.
The Shaffer Court has unquestionably retained the traditional
forms of jurisdiction in rem, including "true" in rem and quasi in rem
I and II. The traditional justification for these forms was thought to
be the sovereign power of the state over property within its borders)
The Court, although rightly rejecting the historical rationale, ap-
parently failed to perceive a crucial distinction between "true" in rem
jurisdiction and jurisdiction quasi in rem 1.1 °1 The distinction is this:
A proceeding that bars unknown claimants to property is in rem, while
an action that affects only the interests of designated persons is quasi
in rem. 0 2  It follows, then, that "true" in rem actions inevitably
adjudicate the potential claims of unknown persons who lack pur-
posive contacts with the forum.
Quiet title actions and proceedings for forfeitures may be either
in rem or quasi in rem, depending on whether the proceeding de-
termines the interests of all persons in the property or determines the
validity of the claim of certain specified persons.'0 3 Even an action to
foreclose a mortgage, usually quasi in rem because the mortgagor is
a known person, could be in rem if, by reason of the death of the
mortgagor, the interests of unknown heirs must be considered in the
adjudication.1' 4 A probate proceeding, however, is always in rem;'0 5
the probate court has jurisdiction over the decedent's estate for pro-
ceedings that affect the claims of all heirs, unknown as well as
known.
10 6
A significant portion of state court jurisdiction consists of in rem
actions that cannot satisfy the minimum contacts standard of Inter-
99. 433 U.S. at 208.
100. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
I01. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
102. Fraser, Actions in Rem, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 29, 36 (1948).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. In an intriguing proposal for ante-mortem probate, Professor Fink, reasoning from
McGee, suggests that such proceedings could be made binding on nonresident beneficiaries
and intestate successors because the -will, as a transaction, would supply an adequate jurisdic-
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national Shoe and Hanson but are consistent with fundamental fair-
ness when the competing interests of the parties and the forum have
been weighed. Surely the Court did not intend to preclude actions
in rem; but just as surely, a literal reading of Shaffer yields no precise
indication of how such actions are to be accommodated within the
new standard.
Close examination of the text suggests that the Shqffer Court
may inadvertently have blurred the important distinction between
jurisdiction in rem and jurisdiction quasi in rem I as it considered
application of the minimum contacts standard to property actions.
Justice Marshall's language presumes a designated defendant whose
"claim to property located in the State would normally indicate that
he expected to benefit from the State's protection of his interest."'0' 7
But an action in rem by definition includes unknown persons, poten-
tial defendants who make no active claim and have no expectation
of benefits from the forum state. In the same paragraph Justice
Marshall spoke of "claims to the property itself [as] the source of the
underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant."'t 8
Again, there is a strong presumption of designated parties; neverthe-
less, Justice Marshall asserted, in a footnote, that "[tihis category
includes true in rem actions and the first type of quasi in rem pro-
ceedings.10 9  Retreat from that assertion would not weaken the
opinion, but would allay the justifiable fear of Justice Powell'"' and
Justice Stevens... that Shaffer will adversely affect real property ac-
tions.
The fact that unknown persons may be involved in litigation in-
creases the need for uniform adjudication in a single forum." 2 The
Court, having remained loyal to the traditional categories of jurisdic-
tion in Shaffer, might be receptive to a systematic accommodation of
"true" in rem jurisdiction, so that the entire category need not be
dealt with as aberrant or exceptional.
A rigorous requirement that every defendant in a real property
action possess minimum contacts with the forum greatly reduces the
chance that there will exist at least one forum that can perfect title.'"
tional nexus with the fonum. Fink, Ante-Mortem Probate Revisited: Can an Idea Have a Life
After Death?, 37 Osno STATE L.J. 264, 279 (1976). Under the proposed interpretation of
Shaffer, ante-mortem probate,.and conventional probate, which both affect the interests of
persons unknown or unborn, would be subjected to a standard of "fair play and substantial
justice," not "minimum contacts."
107. 433 U.S. at 207-08 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 207.
109. Id. n.24.
110. Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
11 1." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
112. See, e.g., Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 97, at 1153.
113. Even in an action quasi in rem I, a known claimant may not be susceptible to juris-
diction under the minimum contacts test in the forum where the property is located, In those
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Ordinarily the dictates of "fair play and substantial justice," if not
"minimum contacts," can be reconciled with the need to protect alienabil-
ity of property and allow land development. The proposed analysis
would allow resolution of the conflict created by Shaffer without
sacrifice of due process protection.
To employ the traditional taxonomy of jurisdiction to harmonize
the Shaffer Court's pronouncements with its probable intent seems
retrogressive, yet the proposed interpretation enjoys several advan-
tages. It is consistent with the Court's desire, evinced in Shaffer
and other recent cases,' 4 to expand due process protection. It
eliminates the need to accommodate "difficult" classes of jurisdiction
as isolated exceptions or through the use of fictions. It justifies the
Court's preservation of the traditional categories of jurisdiction. And,
most importantly, it invites a comprehensive and systematic analysis
of jurisdiction, so that fairness may be achieved by consideration of the
interests of all parties and the forum state, even when purposive
contacts are lacking.
V. CONCLUSION
It is now almost twenty years since one commentator suggested
that the traditional test of jurisdiction be replaced by one which would
analyze and balance conflicting interests in order to reach a result con-
sonant with fundamental fairness. This approach ...would apply one
integrated test and would sustain or deny jurisdiction wholly on the
weight of the interests involved. These interests should not be derived
from the convenience of the parties alone; the interests of the forum state
must also be considered.115
That statement still expresses the desideratum of state court juris-
diction; it is truly regrettable that the Court has not embraced it
wholeheartedly.
Perhaps because it wished to reinforce the significance of Inter-
national Shoe, or possibly to prevent the criteria for jurisdiction from
merging completely into the criteria that determine choice of law, 1 6
the Shaffer Court spoke of the "relationship amongthe defendant, the
forum, and the litigation" 1 7 rather than the interests of the defendant,
the forum, and the plaintiff. Despite the Court's announced intent to
adopt an integrated test for state court jurisdiction, the minimum con-
exceptional cases, as the Shaffer Court contemplated, jurisdiction should be allowed if no other
forum is available to the plaintiff and the nonresident claimant is not actually put to great
inconvenience. 433 U.S. at 211 n.37.
114. See cases cited at note 42 supra.
115. Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAMV. L REv. 909, 956
(1960).
116. 433 U.S. at 215.
117. Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
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tacts standard that the Court appears to have imposed is too restrictive
for comprehensive application.
The Shaffer Court spoke decisively in rejecting the power theory
of jurisdiction over property and redressing the lingering unfairness of
the Pennoyer rules of quasi in rem jurisdiction. If the state courts
proceed to apply the minimum contacts test to jurisdiction in per-
sonam and quasi in rem but conduct a broader inquiry into the balance
of interests involved in other exercises of jurisdiction, the spirit, and
most of the letter, of Shaffer will be satisfied.
Melodee Siegel Kornacker
